With its midterm congressional elections less than two weeks away, foreign leaders are waiting to see what impact they will have on America’s international role. No one can deny that Donald Trump has been a consequential president, who has, for good or ill, has sought to rewrite U.S. foreign policy, moving his country away from its longstanding commitments to free trade and a security strategy based on close coordination with traditional allies.
Instead, his administration has pursued a more unilateral approach that seeks outcomes which favor what he perceives as American interests, narrowly defined as the best deal he can leverage his country’s economic and military power to obtain in any given circumstance.
In the almost two years of his second (non-consecutive) term Trump has been able to pursue his foreign policy goals with relatively little resistance from the U.S. Congress, despite its being a branch of government co-equal to the executive and in theory at least able to act as a check on its exercise of power.
However, he has enjoyed the luxury of majorities for his Republican Party in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and within these majorities he has held a dominant position, based upon the support provided to him by a hard core of voters committed to him personally under his “Make America Great Again” banner.
But is Trump’s run of almost unfettered power coming to a close? On November 3, the entire House of Representatives will be up for election as will one third of the Senate. And as the campaign draws to a close, prospects seem grim for Trump and the Republicans. It had been almost taken for granted that the Republicans would lose their narrow majority in the lower chamber, a typical outcome in midterm elections. However, until recently it was thought that their majority in the Senate was safe.
However, as events have evolved, this now seems by no means assured, and, to judge by the polls, there is a good chance that the opposition Democrats will also take over the Senate. Polls, of course, are no guarantee of the final result, and Trump’s Republicans have out-performed them in the past. Nonetheless, the campaign has become a referendum on Trump’s performance, and right now the American people seem prepared to reject it, with his support hovering between 31 and 36 percent.
The reasons for this decline are not hard to find. Even before the current conflict with Iran, unhappiness was rising over a sluggish (although in fairness, hardly disastrous) economy. To a considerable extent the public identified Trump’s commitment to higher tariffs, which increase the cost of goods, with the lackluster economy. Dissatisfaction was then supercharged by the Iran war, which Trump initially had predicted would only last “four or five weeks” but which has dragged on for nearly eight months, during which the price of gasoline has soared by 46 percent.
In this environment the public seems less forgiving of other aspects of Trump’s performance and of the near lockstep support he has received from congressional Republicans. Corruption scandals which Trump had previously been able to shrug off have begun to gain traction with voters, and his bombastic, self-centered, and often insulting style of speaking, once seen as a sign of authenticity, has worn thin.
But even assuming that Trump and his party receive a drubbing at the ballot box, there are limits to how much this will require him to change his behavior on the global stage. Under the U.S. constitution the President is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and directs the conduct of foreign policy. And in any event, the new Congress will not take office until January 3, leaving Trump free from its oversight for two months.
Trump thus remains able to take further action regarding Iran, whether it be renewing military operations or reaching some kind of agreement. And should he wish to cut off the intelligence support which the United States provides to Ukraine (there has been one mysterious interruption already), he can do so unhindered. And the trade deals which he has been negotiating with a range of countries, as follow-up to his earlier unilateral imposition of tariffs, are “executive agreements,” not treaties, and thus will not require ratification by the United States Senate.
This does not mean a new and less compliant Congress will be without some tools to press Trump. Its approval will be required will be required for the massive increase in the defense budget which he is seeking. And should it choose, it may put a check on his tendency to move already budgeted money to different accounts to pursue his preferred objectives.
Congress can undertake investigations and call public hearings to hold senior officials to account for their actions. It can refuse to confirm Presidential appointments. And it could even seek to remove Trump from office through the impeachment process, as was tried unsuccessfully twice in his first term. (The bar for success is extremely high as a conviction requires a two-thirds majority in the Senate.)
But perhaps the most notable consequence for Trump of defeat in the midterm elections would be the definitive loss of the aura of invincibility which accompanied his return to office in 2025. This could have a significant impact on his ability to impose his will internationally, and we are already seeing some signs that he is playing a weaker hand than before.
While earlier in his term, trading partners felt impelled to take what they could get in negotiations to minimize the effects of his tariffs, more recently countries such as Canada, Brazil, and India have balked at his demands. America’s European allies continue to support Ukraine despite his evident sympathy for Russia and remain reluctant to join him in any further military action against Iran.
Nonetheless, the American Presidency is a uniquely powerful institution, and Trump has shown himself to be prepared to take maximum advantage of its prerogatives. At the same time, he has proven to be willing to make sudden 180 degree turns when necessary. Will a post-midterm Trump adjust to a more constrained environment or will he use his last years in office (he cannot seek reelection) to try to impose his vision on the world at any cost?
The first two years of Trump’s current term have been a wild ride. Depending how he reacts to the upcoming vote, the next two could be even wilder.
Richard M. Sanders is a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, a Washington DC institution which analyzes international affairs from a perspective of strategic realism.
Source : MSN